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Abstract 
This study explores the channels through which the regulations impact on stability in the banking 
sector of the transition countries. We argue that the channels through which the different 
regulations affecting stability vary between EU-member and non-EU transition countries. Our 
study considers 370 banks from 20 transition countries for the period 2001-2013, where 11 are 
EU-member (Bulgaria, Croatia, Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, 
Romania, Slovakia and Slovenia) and 9 are non-EU (Albania, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, 
Bosnia, Kazakhstan, Macedonia, Serbia, and Ukraine) states. Our results show that higher 
economic growth and less competitive conditions would lead to a more stable banking sector in 
early (EU-member) transition countries. Moreover, the stabilisation effect of different 
regulations such as capital requirement, activity restrictions and supervisors (mainly Central 
Banks and other government bodies) is higher to the banks with higher market power. For non-
EU transition countries we find that higher inflation rates significantly impact on higher levels of 
risk taking. However, capital requirements have a stabilisation effect and thus its higher level 
leads to more stable banking sectors in both groups of countries. Overall, our results are 
consistent with the theory that the outcome of the regulations-reforms varies across countries 
according to their institutional development and therefore the impact of banking regulation is 
different between EU-member (early) and non-EU member (late) transition countries.  
Keywords: Banks, regulation, transition economies. 





It has been established that the presence of a sound banking sector is important for ensuring that 
the financial system and economy run smoothly and efficiently as banks play a crucial role in 
channelling funds from lenders to borrowers with productive investment projects. However, 
following the Asian financial crisis in 1997 as well as the recent global financial crisis (2007-
2008), the relationship among stability (or risk taking), competition and regulations has attracted 
increased attention by scholars and policy makers.  
Over the last 25 years the banking sectors of transition countries have undergone significant 
changes. Particularly, the establishment of a two-tier banking systems has been accompanied by 
consolidation, entry of foreign banks as well as strengthening of prudential regulation and 
supervision.  One may assume that all of these changes posed great challenges to the banks of 
transition countries as the environment in which they operate changed significantly.  
Many recent studies focus on various aspects of the banking sector in transition countries 
(Grigorian & Manole, 2006; Peresetsky, 2010; Pruteanu-Podpiera, Weill, & Schobert, 2008; 
Weill, 2003), but the research addressing the impact of regulations on banking stability is 
limited. Thus, the main aim of this study is to explore the channels through which the regulations 
impact on stability in the banking sector of the transition countries.  
This study is important as it contributes to the existing literature in several aspects.  Firstly, it 
employs a richer dataset that covers the period before, during and after the recent global crisis 
period (2000-2013) for these countries. Secondly, it includes more transition countries. Thirdly, 
the paper investigates EU member and non-EU transition countries separately as authors believe 
that the determinants of banking stability vary across these two groups of countries. This paper 
builds on research by  Agoraki, Delis, and Pasiouras (2011), which is the only study 
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investigating the effect of regulations on stability in transition countries. The results are 
interesting not only for academics and bank officials, but also for other stakeholders such as 
policy-makers, central bankers and other financial authorities. The results show that the lower 
competition would stabilise the banking sectors of EU member transition countries. Moreover, 
higher rates of economic growth stabilise the banking sectors of EU member transition countries, 
while the opposite is true for the impact of inflation on the banking sectors of non-EU transition 
countries. The paper is structured as follows. Section 2 discusses the background literature. 
Section 3 describes the data and methods used. Section 4 presents the findings from the empirical 
analysis, and Section 5 concludes and suggests some policy recommendations.  
2. Background literature 
 
There are many studies investigating bank regulations (Barth, Caprio, and Levine 2004; Barth et 
al. 2013; Beck, Demirgüç-Kunt, and Levine 2006b; Klomp and De Haan 2012), however, the 
literature on the impacts of regulations on banking sector stability is still limited and 
inconclusive. Thus, following the aim of the paper, we discuss the studies addressing the effect 
of bank regulations and supervision on bank stability.  
The literature often states two functions of bank capital, where the first views capital as a buffer 
allowing for the orderly use of assets and thus protecting debt holders from losses, while the 
second views that it provides incentives for owners and managers to take less risk (Gale 2010; 
Chortareas, Girardone, and Ventouri 2012). Although experts and scholars disagree on whether 
the imposition of a minimum capital requirement reduces risk-taking behaviour of bank owners 
and managers (Blum 1999), it is believed that capital adequacy regulations play an important 
role in more careful lending and better bank performance (Keeley and Furlong 1990; Kaufman 
1992). The theory suggests that high capital requirements increase entry barriers for new banks 
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allowing existing banks to accumulate power and thus taking less-risky behaviour in the markets 
with lower levels of competition (Agoraki, Delis, and Pasiouras 2011). However, studies suggest 
contrasting conclusions on this argument. Some investigations conclude that more stringent 
capital requirements lead banks to set more strict rules in granting new loans and thus take less 
risks (Bolt and Tieman 2004; Barth, Caprio, and Levine 2004), while others suggest that high 
capital requirements harm franchise value and thus encourage banks to take higher risks 
implying a positive capital-risk nexus (Shrieves and Dahl 1992; Hellmann, Murdock, and Stiglitz 
2000). 
The studies addressing the impact of bank activity restrictions also have contrasting conclusions. 
Some suggest that bank activity restrictions reduce risk taking complementing deposit insurance 
and capital requirements in highly competitive markets (Matutes and Vives 2000). One group of 
studies suggest that restrictions on bank activities influence competition in other segments of the 
market, which may increase the risk of insolvency (Lepetit et al. 2008). While other studies 
suggest that lower restrictions on bank activities can also lead to higher competition through 
harming charter value of banks and thus encouraging them to take higher risks (Gonzalez 2005; 
Claessens and Laeven 2004). However, the results by Agoraki, Delis, and Pasiouras (2011) 
support the argument that strict restrictions on bank activities reduce insolvency risk.  
There are two dominant views regarding the impact of supervisory power on stability. The first, 
public interest view, supports the argument that a powerful supervisor can enhance bank 
governance, efficiency, competition and thus improve stability (Beck, Demirgüç-Kunt, and 
Levine 2006a). However, Beck, Demirgüç-Kunt, and Levine (2006a) also suggest that powerful 
supervisors may force banks to allocate loans supporting supervisors’ private benefits or political 
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interests. This is in line with the private interest view arguing that supervisors do not focus on 
overcoming market failures. 
The link between competition and stability has been at the centre of academic-policy debate 
particularly over the last two decades. There are two dominant views regarding the impact of 
competition on stability. The first, “competition-fragility,” arguing that higher competition 
diminishes market power of bank, their profit margins and franchise value, which ultimately 
encourages banks to take higher risks. However, “competition-stability,” on the other hand, 
states that in the markets with limited competition banks tend to gain high market power 
encouraging them to charge higher rates to loan customers, which makes it difficult to repay 
loans leading to higher risks. The existing studies provide mixed results on the effect of 
competition. Berger, Klapper, and Turk-Ariss (2009) suggest that banks with a higher degree of 
market power have less overall risk exposure supporting “competition-fragility” view. 
Additionally, some studies argue that an increase in competition will have a larger impact on 
banks’ fragility in countries with stricter activity restrictions (Beck, De Jonghe, and Schepens 
2013). However, other studies suggest that greater concentration increases financial fragility and 
argue that more competitive banking systems are less prone to experience a systemic crisis 
(Schaeck, Cihak, and Wolfe 2009; Fu, Lin, and Molyneux 2014).      
 Overall, our discussions indicate that the literature does not have robust conclusions on the 
impact of regulations to stabilise banking sectors. The research addressing this problem in 
transition countries is limited. This paper builds on the research by Agoraki, Delis, and Pasiouras 
(2011), which is the only study investigating the effect of regulations on stability in transition 
countries. We advance the existing literature by (1) employing recent and longer period of data; 
(2) including more transition countries; and (3) investigating EU member and non-EU transition 
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countries separately. Additionally, we aim to investigate whether regulations have an 
independent effect on stability or whether this effect is channeled through market power of 
banks.    
 
3. Data, econometric specifications and variables 
3.1 Data 
The sample consists of 370 banks from 20 transition economies.  Eleven are EU member 
transition countries, which are considered to be the early transition group. These are: Bulgaria, 
Croatia, Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Romania, Slovakia and 
Slovenia. The remaining nine countries are non-EU member states of Europe (Albania, Bosnia, 
Macedonia and Serbia) and the former Soviet Union (Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Kazakhstan 
and Ukraine). The data are from Bankscope and are an unbalanced panel.  All are commercial 
banks whose financial statements are available for at least three years over the period 2001-2013. 
All the bank relevant data are in US dollars at a current exchange rate. The statistics for the 
growth of GDP, GDP per capita and inflation are from the World Bank’s World Development 
Indicators (2014). The overall economic freedom variable is from the Heritage Foundation.  The 
regulatory data are obtained from the World Bank’s surveys on “Bank Regulation and 
Supervision.” 
3.2 Econometric specifications and variables 
The relevant studies use static and dynamic specifications investigating the risk and stability in 
banking sectors. Agoraki, Delis, and Pasiouras (2011), the only paper investigating the risk 
taking behaviour of banks in transition countries, uses instrumental variable and dynamic panel 
specifications, in which regulations are considered to be endogenous. Particularly, the scholars 
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consider the reverse causality between risk taking behaviour and regulations, that is regulations 
impact on risk taking behaviour of banks and risk taking behaviour may also lead to changes in 
existing regulations in the subsequent periods.  This study considers the period 1998-2005, when 
the transition countries were reforming all economic sectors and the financial sector, particularly, 
was not stable because of frequent changes in policy and reforms. However, over the last decade 
the financial sectors in these transition countries have been relatively stable having minor 
changes in regulations. Therefore, we aim to use static (fixed and random effects) specifications 
to investigate the following model:   
𝑙𝑛𝑍𝑖,𝑡 = 𝑏0 + 𝛿𝑙𝑛𝑍𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝑏1𝑙𝑛𝐸𝐴𝑖,𝑡 + 𝑏2ln⁡(𝐿𝑒𝑟𝑛𝑒𝑟)𝑖,𝑡 + 𝑏3𝑅𝑒𝑔𝑢𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑡 + ⁡𝑏4𝑙𝑛(𝐿𝑒𝑟𝑛𝑒𝑟⁡𝑥⁡𝑅𝑒𝑔𝑢𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑠)𝑖,𝑡 +
+⁡𝑏5𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑠𝑡 + 𝜇𝑖𝑡      (1) 
where δ lies between 0 and 1 and shows the speed of adjustment. Particularly, values closer to 0 
indicate that the speed of adjustment is high, while values closer to 1 show a very slow 
adjustment. The EA, Lerner and Regulations are equity to asset ratio, Lerner index and 
regulations variables respectively. The Control includes bank-level, industry-level and regional 
control variables.    
3.2.1 Dependent variable 
Following the recent studies we use the Z score as a dependent variable of stability, which has 
widely been known as a proxy for risk measurement as well (Agoraki, Delis, and Pasiouras 
2011; Fratzscher, König, and Lambert 2016). The Z score is monotonically associated with a 







      (2) 
 
where ROA is return on assets, E/A equity to asset ratio and⁡SD(ROA) denotes standard 
deviation of ROA. Since the Z score indicates the distance to insolvency a higher Z score implies 
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that a bank is less risky. As the Z score is highly skewed we use the natural logarithm form of the 
Z score.  
3.2.2 The Lerner Index  
 
Following the recent studies, we calculate the Lerner index to estimate the degree of market 
power of banks (Agoraki, Delis, and Pasiouras 2011; Beck, De Jonghe, and Schepens 2013; 
Soedarmono, Machrouh, and Tarazi 2013). The Lerner index has been used as a proxy for 
competition as well, where values closer to 0 imply perfect competition and values closer to 1 









 is the price of bank output (the ratio of interest income to total earning assets) and 
𝑚𝑐𝑖,𝑡 is the marginal cost. The following translog function is used to calculate the marginal cost:  





















2 + 𝑏5(𝑙𝑛⁡𝑞𝑖,𝑡)(𝑙𝑛⁡𝑑𝑖,𝑡) + 𝑏5(𝑙𝑛⁡𝑞𝑖,𝑡)(𝑙𝑛⁡𝑤1𝑖,𝑡) + 𝑏5(𝑙𝑛⁡𝑞𝑖,𝑡)(𝑙𝑛⁡𝑤2𝑖,𝑡) +
𝑏5(𝑙𝑛⁡𝑞𝑖,𝑡)(𝑙𝑛⁡𝑤3𝑖,𝑡) + 𝑏5(𝑙𝑛⁡𝑑𝑖,𝑡)(𝑙𝑛⁡𝑤1𝑖,𝑡) + 𝑏5(𝑙𝑛⁡𝑑𝑖,𝑡)(𝑙𝑛⁡𝑤2𝑖,𝑡) + 𝑏5(𝑙𝑛⁡𝑑𝑖,𝑡)(𝑙𝑛⁡𝑤3𝑖,𝑡) +
𝑏5(𝑙𝑛⁡𝑤1𝑖,𝑡)(𝑙𝑛⁡𝑤2𝑖,𝑡) + 𝑏5(𝑙𝑛⁡𝑤1𝑖,𝑡)(𝑙𝑛⁡𝑤3𝑖,𝑡) + 𝑏5(𝑙𝑛⁡𝑤2𝑖,𝑡)(𝑙𝑛⁡𝑤3𝑖,𝑡) + 𝐷𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑒𝑠𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡   (3) 
 
where C is total cost of bank i at period t. Additionally, q, d and w are bank output, deposit and 
input prices respectively. Some existing studies calculate Eq. 3 combining all transition countries 
into one group (Agoraki, Delis, and Pasiouras 2011). However, considering significant 
differences among transition countries we calculate Eq. 3 for two groups of countries separately, 
particularly, early (EU-member) and late (non-EU). To control for cross-bank and cross-country 
heterogeneity we use variables at bank and country levels such as credit risk (loan loss 
provisions / gross loans), number of years under EU membership, financial freedom of Heritage 
Foundation and GDP. Sample for some countries is small and therefore cross-country 
calculations of marginal cost could provide poor results. However, we calculated the marginal 
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cost and Lerner index at a single country level too and the results, consistent with the existing 
studies, were not significantly different (Agoraki, Delis, and Pasiouras 2011).  
3.2.3 Other variables 
 
The natural logarithm of equity to total assets (LEA) ratio is used as a proxy for bank capital. 
Additionally, our analyses consider three types of regulations such as capital requirement 
(CapReq), restrictions on activities (Restrict) and supervisory power (Supervisor) which are 
calculated using the World Bank’s surveys on Bank Regulation and Supervision (Table 1). 
   Table 1. Description and sources of other variables 
 
Other variables Description Source 
Lea Natural logarithm (equity/total assets) Bankscope 
Size Natural logarithm (total assets) Bankscope 
Finfreedom Financial freedom is a measure of banking efficiency as well as a 
measure of independence from government control and interference in 
the financial sector. The score ranges from 0 to 100, where a score 
closer to 100 indicates more independent financial sector.  
Heritage Foundation (2014) 
Lgrowth Natural logarithm (GDP growth) World Bank’s World 
Development Indicators 
(2014) 
Linflation Natural logarithm (inflation) World Bank’s World 
Development Indicators 
(2014) 
EU member This variable shows the number of years a country, in which a bank 
exists, is under EU membership.  
 
CapReq Capital Requirement index is calculated based on the World Bank’s 
surveys on Bank Regulation and Supervision.  Four versions of the 
surveys are used  - Versions I (2001) for 2000-2001, II (2003) for 
2002-2004, III (2007) for 2005-2007 and IV (2012) for 2008-2014.  
World Bank’s surveys on 
Bank Regulation and 
Supervision 
Restrict Restrictions on activities index is calculated based on the World 
Bank’s surveys on Bank Regulation and Supervision.  Four versions of 
the surveys are used  - Versions I (2001) for 2000-2001, II (2003) for 
2002-2004, III (2007) for 2005-2007 and IV (2012) for 2008-2014. 
World Bank’s surveys on 
Bank Regulation and 
Supervision 
Supervisor Supervisory power is calculated based on the World Bank’s surveys on 
Bank Regulation and Supervision.  Four versions of the surveys are 
used  - Versions I (2001) for 2000-2001, II (2003) for 2002-2004, III 
(2007) for 2005-2007 and IV (2012) for 2008-2014. 
World Bank’s surveys on 
Bank Regulation and 
Supervision 
LlernerxCapReq Natural logarithm (lerner*capreq) Bankscope and World 
Bank’s surveys on Bank 
Regulation and Supervision 
LlernerxRestrict Natural logarithm (lerner*restrict) Bankscope and World 
Bank’s surveys on Bank 
Regulation and Supervision 
LlernerxSupervisor Natural logarithm (lerner*supervisor) Bankscope and World 
Bank’s surveys on Bank 




Capital requirement shows initial and overall capital stringency ranging between 0 and 8, where 
higher scores indicate higher capital stringency. Particularly, initial capital stringency refers to 
whether the sources of funds (regulatory capital) can include assets other than cash or 
government securities and borrowed funds, as well as whether the regulatory or supervisory 
authorities verify these sources. Overall capital stringency, however, shows whether risk 
elements and value losses are considered when calculating the regulatory capital. The second 
index (Restrict) is calculated by considering whether banks are allowed for securities, insurance 
and real estate activities as well as for ownership of non-financial firms. This index ranges 
between 1 and 4 and higher values indicate higher restrictions. Our third Supervisor index 
considers whether supervisory authorities can take specific actions against bank management, 
shareholders and auditors. This index ranges between 0 and 14, where higher values indicate 
more powerful supervisors.  
To improve the fit we employ control variables at bank, industry and macro levels. The natural 
logarithm of total assets is included into the model to control for bank size differences, while the 
variable of financial freedom (FinFreedom) is used to account for industry differences across 
transition countries. Additionally, the natural logarithms of GDP growth as well as inflation are 
employed to control for macroeconomic differences. Moreover, our analyses of EU member 
transition countries include an EU membership variable (EU member) to account for EU 
membership effects.        
 
4. Estimation and Results 
 
 
Table 2 shows the arithmetic mean and the correlations among the variables. The table shows 
that the natural logarithm forms of the products of the regulations variables with Lerner index 
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(lerner x capreq, lerner x restrict and lerner x supervisor) have very strong correlations with each 
other as well as with the natural logarithm form of Lerner index. Therefore, we drop Lerner 
index when we include these variables (lerner x capreq, lerner x restrict and lerner x supervisor) 
into the model. Moreover, we use only one of them at a time since there are strong correlations 
among these variables
1
.    
To ensure the robustness and sustainability of the results we use two, namely, fixed- and 
random-effects estimators and presented the results in Tables 3, 4 and 5. Particularly, Table 3 
presents the results for the model including all transition countries, while Tables 4 and 5 show 
the results for EU member and non-EU member transition countries respectively. The results for 
the regulations variables such as capital requirement (capreq), restrictions (restrict) and 
supervisory power (supervisor) are not stable implying that there are no direct effects of the 
regulations to the bank sector stability. The results also indicate that the equity-asset ratio has 
stabilisation effects in both EU member and non-EU transition countries. Additionally, the 
results show that the lower competition would also stabilise the banking sectors of EU member 
transition countries. Moreover, higher rates of economic growth stabilises the banking sectors of 
EU member transition countries, while the opposite is true for the impact of inflation on the 
banking sectors of non-EU transition countries. However, the results for size and financial 
freedom are not stable across models.    
                                                          
1





Table 2. Correlation matrix of variables 
  
*The arithmetic means are calculated without natural logarithms. llerner –natural logarithm of lerner index. 





Variables Mean* Z score Llerner LEA Size 
Fin 
freedom 





Z score 2.26             
llerner -0.40 -0.07***            
lea -2.01 0.25*** -0.09***           
size 6.40 -0.07*** 0.20*** -0.53***          
finfreedom 57.10 0.09*** -0.12*** -0.21*** 0.20***         
lgrowth 1.37 -0.05*** -0.04** 0.05*** -0.18*** -0.04**        
linflation 1.57 -0.16*** 0.07*** 0.18*** -0.14*** -0.49*** 0.26***       
capReq 5.21 -0.07*** -0.06*** -0.18*** 0.16*** -0.15*** -0.13*** -0.01      
restrict 9.49 0.08*** 0.08*** 0.09*** 0.01 0.01 0.15*** 0.05*** -0.24***     
supervisor 11.46 -0.02 -0.07*** -0.11*** 0.14*** 0.25*** -0.26*** -0.33*** 0.11*** -0.28***    
llerner x capreq 1.23 -0.14** 0.70*** -0.16*** 0.28*** -0.25*** -0.09*** 0.17*** 0.69*** -0.04** -0.02   
llerner x restrict 1.82 -0.01 0.85*** -0.02 0.14*** -0.09*** 0.06*** 0.10*** -0.21*** 0.59*** -0.26*** 0.54***  
llerner x supervisor 2.03 -0.08*** 0.87*** -0.15*** 0.25*** 0.01 -0.16*** -0.07*** -0.01 -0.10*** 0.42*** 0.62*** 0.65*** 
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Table 3. All transition countries 
Variables 
Fixed-effects Random-effects 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 
           
Lagged Z score 0.074* 0.073 0.040* 0.073 0.073 0.600*** 0.603*** 0.513*** 0.604*** 0.603*** 
 (0.045) (0.045) (0.022) (0.045) (0.045) (0.034) (0.034) (0.039) (0.034) (0.034) 
lea 0.915*** 0.915*** 1.010*** 0.915*** 0.915*** 0.482*** 0.477*** 0.582*** 0.477*** 0.478*** 
 (0.088) (0.089) (0.033) (0.089) (0.089) (0.047) (0.047) (0.055) (0.047) (0.047) 
llerner 0.079*** 0.078***    0.082** 0.079**    
 (0.022) (0.022)    (0.032) (0.032)    
size 0.017 0.015 0.028 0.014 0.015 0.059*** 0.056*** 0.064*** 0.056*** 0.056*** 
 (0.026) (0.026) (0.018) (0.026) (0.026) (0.012) (0.012) (0.014) (0.012) (0.012) 
finfreedom -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 0.001* 0.002** 0.002** 0.002** 0.002** 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
lgrowth 0.008 0.007 0.003 0.007 0.007 0.013 0.017 0.013 0.018 0.017 
 (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.011) (0.011) (0.010) (0.011) (0.011) 
linflation -0.014* -0.017** -0.018** -0.017** -0.017** -0.045*** -0.049*** -0.044*** -0.049*** -0.049*** 
 (0.008) (0.008) (0.007) (0.008) (0.008) (0.011) (0.011) (0.010) (0.011) (0.011) 
eumember -0.002 -0.003 -0.002 -0.003 -0.003 0.009* 0.004 0.005 0.005 0.005 
 (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) 
capreq  0.004 -0.017** 0.004 0.004  0.014*** -0.018** 0.014*** 0.014*** 
  (0.004) (0.007) (0.004) (0.004)  (0.005) (0.009) (0.005) (0.005) 
restrict  0.006* 0.006 -0.003 0.005  -0.001 0.003 -0.010** -0.001 
  (0.003) (0.004) (0.004) (0.003)  (0.004) (0.004) (0.005) (0.004) 
supervisor  0.004 0.006 0.004 -0.004  -0.010* -0.008 -0.010* -0.018*** 
  (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005)  (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.007) 
llerner x 
capreq 
  0.098***     0.083***   
   (0.023)     (0.029)   
Llerner x 
restrict 
   0.079***     0.082**  
    (0.022)     (0.032)  
Llerner x 
supervisor 
    0.080***     0.081** 
     (0.023)     (0.032) 
Constant 3.885*** 3.778*** 3.932*** 3.678*** 3.678*** 1.382*** 1.428*** 1.777*** 1.325*** 1.327*** 
 (0.182) (0.184) (0.152) (0.180) (0.180) (0.153) (0.169) (0.186) (0.162) (0.162) 
           
Observations 2,145 2,145 2,014 2,145 2,145 2,145 2,145 2,014 2,145 2,145 
R-squared 0.726 0.728 0.768 0.728 0.728 0.794 0.800 0.740 0.800 0.800 
Number of 
banks 
376 376 368 376 376 376 376 368 376 376 
Robust standard errors are in brackets. Coefficients that are significantly different from zero at the 1%, 5% and 10% level are marked with ***, ** and * respectively. Year 







Table 4. EU member transition countries 
Robust standard errors are in brackets. Coefficients that are significantly different from zero at the 1%, 5% and 10% level are marked with ***, ** and * respectively. Year 
dummies for 2001-2012 are removed to save space.  
Variables Fixed-effects Random-effects 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 
           
Lagged Z score 0.069** 0.067** 0.067** 0.067** 0.067** 0.619*** 0.616*** 0.616*** 0.616*** 0.616*** 
 (0.029) (0.028) (0.028) (0.028) (0.028) (0.051) (0.051) (0.051) (0.051) (0.051) 
lea 0.975*** 0.974*** 0.975*** 0.973*** 0.975*** 0.490*** 0.493*** 0.493*** 0.492*** 0.493*** 
 (0.039) (0.039) (0.039) (0.039) (0.039) (0.074) (0.074) (0.074) (0.074) (0.074) 
llerner 0.107*** 0.106***    0.092** 0.092**    
 (0.028) (0.029)    (0.038) (0.038)    
size 0.023 0.016 0.016 0.016 0.016 0.055*** 0.054*** 0.055*** 0.054*** 0.054*** 
 (0.022) (0.022) (0.022) (0.022) (0.022) (0.016) (0.016) (0.016) (0.016) (0.016) 
finfreedom -0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 -0.000 0.000 -0.000 0.000 0.000 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
lgrowth 0.042*** 0.043*** 0.042*** 0.042*** 0.042*** 0.068*** 0.071*** 0.070*** 0.070*** 0.070*** 
 (0.011) (0.012) (0.012) (0.012) (0.012) (0.014) (0.015) (0.015) (0.015) (0.015) 
linflation -0.006 -0.008 -0.008 -0.008 -0.008 -0.016 -0.019 -0.019 -0.019 -0.019 
 (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.012) (0.014) (0.014) (0.014) (0.014) 
eumember 0.001 0.008 0.008 0.007 0.007 -0.009 -0.006 -0.006 -0.007 -0.006 
 (0.008) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.010) (0.011) (0.011) (0.010) (0.011) 
capreq  0.011 -0.010 0.010 0.011  0.008 -0.008 0.008 0.008 
  (0.007) (0.008) (0.007) (0.007)  (0.008) (0.010) (0.008) (0.008) 
restrict  0.002 0.001 -0.009** 0.001  -0.002 -0.002 -0.011* -0.002 
  (0.003) (0.003) (0.005) (0.003)  (0.004) (0.004) (0.006) (0.004) 
supervisor  0.002 0.003 0.003 -0.007  -0.007 -0.006 -0.007 -0.015* 
  (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007)  (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.009) 
llerner x capreq   0.108***     0.086**   
   (0.029)     (0.037)   
llerner x restrict    0.104***     0.093**  
    (0.029)     (0.038)  
llerner x supervisor     0.107***     0.093** 
     (0.029)     (0.038) 
Constant 4.157*** 4.004*** 3.951*** 3.872*** 3.862*** 1.628*** 1.658*** 1.598*** 1.546*** 1.530*** 
 (0.199) (0.236) (0.239) (0.243) (0.242) (0.224) (0.266) (0.266) (0.268) (0.269) 
           
Observations 1,169 1,169 1,169 1,169 1,169 1,169 1,169 1,169 1,169 1,169 
R-squared 0.757 0.760 0.760 0.759 0.760 0.825 0.823 0.823 0.823 0.823 




Table 5. Non-EU transition countries 
Variables Fixed-effects Random-effects 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 
           
Lagged Z score 0.071 0.069 0.019 0.069 0.069 0.606*** 0.609*** 0.436*** 0.609*** 0.608*** 
 (0.059) (0.060) (0.028) (0.060) (0.060) (0.045) (0.044) (0.055) (0.044) (0.044) 
lea 0.874*** 0.874*** 1.031*** 0.874*** 0.874*** 0.460*** 0.456*** 0.658*** 0.456*** 0.457*** 
 (0.127) (0.129) (0.050) (0.129) (0.129) (0.063) (0.062) (0.081) (0.062) (0.062) 
llerner 0.036 0.036    0.129* 0.123*    
 (0.026) (0.028)    (0.068) (0.065)    
size 0.013 0.014 0.041 0.013 0.013 0.034* 0.030 0.036 0.030 0.030 
 (0.042) (0.043) (0.033) (0.043) (0.043) (0.020) (0.021) (0.025) (0.021) (0.021) 
finfreedom -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 0.001 0.002** 0.002** 0.002** 0.002** 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
lgrowth -0.004 -0.004 -0.008 -0.004 -0.004 -0.010 -0.001 -0.004 -0.001 -0.001 
 (0.009) (0.010) (0.009) (0.010) (0.010) (0.015) (0.016) (0.013) (0.016) (0.016) 
linflation -0.041** -0.040** -0.035* -0.040** -0.040** -0.080*** -0.081*** -0.052*** -0.081*** -0.082*** 
 (0.018) (0.018) (0.019) (0.018) (0.018) (0.020) (0.021) (0.018) (0.021) (0.020) 
capreq  0.002 -0.024 0.002 0.001  0.014* -0.058*** 0.015* 0.014* 
  (0.006) (0.015) (0.006) (0.006)  (0.008) (0.019) (0.008) (0.008) 
restrict  -0.023 -0.020 -0.027 -0.024  -0.026* -0.029 -0.039** -0.027* 
  (0.029) (0.032) (0.029) (0.029)  (0.016) (0.019) (0.016) (0.016) 
supervisor  0.006 0.011 0.006 0.001  -0.021** -0.016* -0.021** -0.035*** 
  (0.009) (0.007) (0.009) (0.008)  (0.010) (0.009) (0.010) (0.012) 
llerner x capreq   0.083**     0.135**   
   (0.037)     (0.056)   
llerner x restrict    0.037     0.126*  
    (0.028)     (0.066)  
llerner x supervisor     0.038     0.127* 
     (0.028)     (0.065) 
Constant 3.606*** 3.757*** 3.943*** 3.709*** 3.722*** 1.565*** 1.931*** 2.777*** 1.772*** 1.799*** 
 (0.236) (0.401) (0.432) (0.401) (0.401) (0.256) (0.335) (0.309) (0.321) (0.321) 
           
Observations 976 976 845 976 976 976 976 845 976 976 
R-squared 0.714 0.715 0.786 0.715 0.715 0.777 0.784 0.662 0.784 0.783 
Number of id 179 179 171 179 179 179 179 171 179 179 
Robust standard errors are in brackets. Coefficients that are significantly different from zero at the 1%, 5% and 10% level are marked with ***, ** and * respectively. Year 





The products of regulations with Lerner index are all significant with positive signs implying 
stabilisation effects of these variables in EU member transition countries. Particularly, banking 
regulations and policies such as capital requirement, restrictions on activities and supervisory 
power have stabilisation effects through banks with higher market power in EU member 
transition countries. However, this is not the case for non-EU member transition countries, where 
only the product of Lerner index with capital requirement (lerner x capreq) has stabilisation 
effects. The results imply that transition countries of both groups could improve the level of the 
stabilisation via decreasing the level of competition. Moreover, they suggest that banking 
regulations do not affect all banks uniformly and the factors impacting on banking stability are 
different in two different groups of transition countries. Our results are consistent with the 
studies supporting the view of “competition-fragility” (Berger, Klapper, and Turk-Ariss 2009) as 
well as tightening regulations to stabilise banking sectors (Fratzscher, König, and Lambert 
2016).  
5. Conclusion 
This study investigates the channels through which the regulations impact on stability in the 
banking sector of the transition countries. We argue that the channels through which regulations 
affecting stability vary between EU-member and non-EU transition countries. Our results show 
that higher economic growth and less competitive conditions would lead to a more stable 
banking sector in early (EU-member) transition countries. Moreover, the stabilisation effects of 
different regulations such as capital requirement, restrictions and supervisors (mainly Central 
Banks and other government bodies) take place through the banks with higher market power. For 
non-EU transition countries we find that higher inflation rates significantly impact on higher 
levels of risk taking. However, only capital requirements have direct and indirect (via market 
17 
 
power) stabilisation effects and thus higher capital requirements will lead to more stable banking 
sectors in non-EU transition countries. Overall, our results are consistent with the theory that the 
outcome of the regulations-reforms varies across countries according to their institutional 
development and therefore the impact of banking regulation is different between EU-member 
(early) and non-EU member (late) transition countries. 
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